Following the overthrow of Saddam’s Ba’athist regime and the formation of a new political system in Iraq, its policy toward dealing with the Arab and international arena was to resolve the disputes left by Saddam, to reduce tensions with neighboring countries and to not interfere in their internal affairs and actively participation in the international community, especially in issues such as combating terrorism, extremism, and environmental challenges.

On the other hand, Arab governments adopted a confrontational approach in front of new Iraq because they did not accept Shiite-centered Iraq and, on the other hand, by marginalizing the Sunni in political arena, they feared the impact of this country’s democratic system on the basis of democracy in the region while the post-2003 Iraqi governments by strengthening the Iraq’s arabic wings sought to gain the trust of the Arab states and improve their relations with the Arab governments.

Following ISIS’s entry into Iraq and the success of Iraqi forces by the big role of popular mobilization forces (Hashd Al-Shabi) on the control and stop of this terrorist group, the approach of the Arab states, and in particular Saudi Arabia, to engage Shiite rule in Iraq was accompanied by a tactical shift and a closer engagement with the shiite currents and Iraqi sovereignty were on the agenda.

In this paper, using descriptive-analytical method and relying on library resources and interviews, while explaining the incentives and barriers to strengthening Iraqi governance relations with the Arab countries, we explain the possible scenarios of Iraqi-Arab relations (specifically Saudi Arabia).

The findings of the article suggest that the curve of Iraqi cooperation and relations with Saudi Arabia will be growing in the short or even medium term, but the process of interactions between the two sides, given that the new Saudi approach to Iraq is tactically and It does not seek to strengthen relations with Iraq strategically, it will not last long.